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I. INTRODUCTION 
In a decision relating to the situation in Kenya,1 on June 18, 2013 
Trial Chamber V(a) of the International Criminal Court (ICC), by 
majority,2 granted William Ruto’s request for excusal from continuous 
presence at trial within the limits of certain conditions.3  However, these 
limitations were not exactly far-reaching, as Ruto is required to be 
present in The Hague only on a very limited number of occasions.4 
Although the Trial Chamber observed that the general rule is one 
of continuous presence at trial, the Chamber concluded that the present 
case is one of “exceptional circumstances” because Ruto became the 
Vice President of Kenya following the March 2013 elections.5  In these 
circumstances, the Chamber held, it was permitted to exercise its 
discretion under Article 64(6)(f) of the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court to excuse the accused from continuous 
 
 1 On the Kenyan ICC cases, see further Thomas Obel Hansen, The International Criminal 
Court in Kenya: Three Defining Features of a Contested Accountability Process and Their 
Implications for the Future of International Justice, 18 AUSTL. J. HUM. RTS. 187 (2012); Chandra 
Sriram & Stephen Brown, Kenya in the Shadow of the ICC: Complementarity, Gravity and 
Impact, 12 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 219 (2012) (U.K.).  On the Kenyan context more broadly, see, 
e.g., Susanne Mueller, Dying to Win: Elections, Political Violence, and Institutional Decay in 
Kenya, 29 J. CONTEMP. AFR. STUD. 99 (2011). 
 2 For the dissenting opinion, see Prosecutor v. Ruto & Sang, Case No. ICC-01/09-01/11-
777-Anx2, Decision on Mr. Ruto’s Request for Excusal from Continuous Presence at Trial 
(Carbuccia, H., dissenting) (June 18, 2013), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1605796.pdf 
[hereinafter “Decision on Mr. Ruto’s Request for Excusal from Continuous Presence at Trial 
(Carbuccia, H., dissenting)]. 
 3 Prosecutor v. Ruto & Sang, Case No. ICC-01/09-01/11-777, Decision on Mr. Ruto’s 
Request for Excusal from Continuous Presence at Trial, ¶ 2 (June 18, 2013), http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1605793.pdf [hereinafter “Decision on Mr. Ruto’s Request for Excusal 
from Continuous Presence at Trial”]. 
 4 The Chamber decided that Ruto must be physically present in the courtroom for the 
following hearings: (i) the entirety of the opening statements of all parties and participants; (ii) 
the entirety of the closing statements of all parties and participants; (iii) when victims present 
their views and concerns in person; (iv) the entirety of the delivery of judgment in the case; (v) 
the entirety of the sentencing hearings (if applicable); (vi) the entirety of the sentencing (if 
applicable); (vii) the entirety of the victim impact hearings (if applicable); (viii) the entirety of the 
reparation hearings (if applicable); and (ix) any other attendance directed by the Chamber.  Id. ¶ 
3.  In essence, therefore, Ruto was granted the right to waive his presence at the vast majority of 
trial hearings, including all of those relating to examination and cross-examination of witnesses 
and presentation of other forms of evidence.  Besides the limited amount of sessions where Ruto 
is required to be present, the Trial Chamber conditioned the decision when holding that Ruto’s 
absence “must always be seen to be directed towards performance of Mr. Ruto’s duties of state,” 
and further required that Ruto file with the Registry a signed waiver.  Id. 
 5 Id. ¶¶ 49-50. 
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presence at trial.6  Accordingly, the Trial Chamber found that because 
Ruto, as Vice President, has “important functions of an extraordinary 
dimension to perform,” he should be treated differently than other (less 
prominent) suspects whose continuous presence is required at trial.7 
The Trial Chamber’s unprecedented decision8–—which the 
Prosecutor was granted leave to appeal and the Appeals Chamber’s 
subsequently decided should be given suspensive effect pending the 
appeal9—deviates from the concept of equality before the law, as 
enshrined both in the Rome Statute and other applicable sources of law.  
In particular, this Comment argues, the decision relies on dubious 
interpretative methods which allowed the Chamber to circumvent the 
wording and intent of otherwise clear provisions in the Statute, notably 
Article 63(1) concerning the accused’s presence at trial,10 and Article 27 
concerning the irrelevance of official capacity and the obligation to treat 
all persons equally under the Statute.11  By basing its decision on Ruto’s 
official status, the Trial Chamber may be creating a precedent to grant 
state officials special treatment in a Court that was intended to target 
those most responsible for international crimes, irrespective of their 
 
 6 Id. ¶ 49.  Article 64(6)(f) provides that “[i]n performing its functions prior to trial or during 
the course of a trial, the Trial Chamber may, as necessary . . . [r]ule on any other relevant 
matters.”  Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 64(6)(f), July 17, 1998, 2187 
U.N.T.S. 90. 
 7 Decision on Mr. Ruto’s Request for Excusal from Continuous Presence at Trial, ¶ 49. 
 8 In no other case has the Court granted state officials any forms of privileges not afforded 
other suspects, nor has it allowed any other accused to be absent at trial.  However, in the Bemba 
case, the trial hearings continued for very short periods in the accused’s absence while he was 
undergoing medical treatment.  See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Ruto & Sang, Case No. ICC-01/09-01/11-
694, Submissions of the Common Legal Representative for Victims on the Defence Request 
Pursuant to Article 63(1) of the Rome Statute, ¶ 11-13 (Apr. 22, 2013). 
 9 The leave to appeal was granted on July 18, 2013.  See Prosecutor v. Ruto & Sang, Case 
No. ICC-01/09-01/11-817, Decision on Prosecution’s Application for Leave to Appeal the 
‘Decision on Mr Ruto’s Request for Excusal from Continuous Presence at Trial’ (July 18, 2013), 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1620766.pdf.  By mid-October 2013, at the time when the 
final editing of this Comment took place, the Appeals Chamber was yet to deliver its decision.  
However, in a decision of August 20, 2013, the Appeals Chamber granted the Prosecutor’s 
request for suspensive effect, resulting that Ruto is required to be present in the courtroom until 
the Appeals Chamber delivers its decision.  See Prosecutor v. Ruto & Sang, Case No. ICC-01/09-
01/11-862, Decision on the Request for Suspensive effect (Aug. 20, 2013), http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1634623.pdf.  Further, on September 23, 2013, President Kenyatta, against 
whom charges have also been brought, filed a similar request to be excused from contiguous 
presence at trial, which Trial Chamber V(b) was yet to decide at the time when this Comment was 
finalized in mid-October 2013.  See Prosecutor v. Kenyatta, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11-809, 
Defence Request for Conditional Excusal from Continuous Presence at Trial (Sept. 23, 2013), 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1649093.pdf. 
 10 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 6, at art. 63(1). 
 11 Id. at art. 27. 
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status or title.12  Furthermore, the decision to allow Ruto’s trial to take 
place largely in his absence will hardly contribute to victims and 
witnesses’ confidence in the proceedings.13 
II. THE CHAMBER’S (MIS)INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE 63 
A. Why Read The Statute As “A Whole” When the Text of Article 63(1) 
is Clear that the Accused Must be Present? 
Article 63(1) of the Rome Statute states that “[t]he accused shall be 
present during the trial.”14  It is widely accepted that the Rome Statute, 
as an international treaty, must be interpreted in accordance with the 
general rules of treaty interpretation spelled out in the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties.15  According to Article 31(1) of the 
Vienna Convention, “[a] treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in 
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the 
treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.”16  It is 
a basic rule of treaty interpretation that the starting point for interpreting 
a provision in the treaty must be taken in the text itself, while context 
and the treaty’s object and purpose must inform its meaning.17  As the 
 
 12 Some have argued that crimes committed by the state, not non-state actors, ought to be the 
focal point for the Court.  See, e.g., William A. Schabas, State Policy as an Element of 
International Crimes, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 953 (2008). 
 13 The Prosecutor alleges that the witnesses in the cases against Ruto, Joshua Sang and Uhuru 
Kenyatta are being intimidated and that the Government of Kenya is not living up to its obligation 
to cooperate with the Court.  See, e.g., Kenya CitizenTV, Witnesses Are Being Intimidated, Says 
ICC Prosecutor, YOUTUBE (Feb. 17, 2013), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GS7Mna5MDno.  
See further infra Part IV. 
 14 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 6, at art. 63(1). 
 15 The Appeals Chamber has emphasized the relevance of the provisions relating to 
interpretation of treaties in the Vienna Convention and clarified their meaning as follows: 
The Appeals Chamber shall not advert to the definition of good faith, save to 
mention that it is linked to what follows and that is the wording of the Statute.  The 
rule governing the interpretation of a section of the law is its wording read in context 
and in light of its object and purpose.  The context of a given legislative provision is 
defined by the particular sub-section of the law read as a whole in conjunction with 
the section of an enactment in its entirety.  Its objects may be gathered from the 
chapter of the law in which the particular section is included and its purpose from 
the wider aims of the law as may be gathered from its preamble and general tenor of 
the treaty. 
See Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Case No. ICC-01/04-168, Judgment on 
the Prosecutor’s Application for Extraordinary Review of Pre-Trial Chamber I’s 31 March 2006 
Decision Denying Leave to Appeal, ¶ 33 (July 13, 2006), http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc183558.pdf. 
 16 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(1), May 22, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. 
 17 See, e.g., David S. Jonas & Thomas N. Saunders, The Object and Purpose of a Treaty: 
Three Interpretive Methods, 43 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 565, 578 (2010). 
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International Law Commission has noted, “the text must be presumed to 
be the authentic expression of the intentions of the parties [and] . . . the 
starting point of interpretation is the elucidation of the meaning of the 
text.”18  Few would dispute that the ordinary meaning of the words 
“shall be present during the trial” is that the trial shall (as opposed to 
can) take place with the accused being present (as opposed to being 
absent).  Keeping in mind the clear text of Article 63(1), how then did 
the Trial Chamber manage to reach a conclusion that Ruto does not 
need to be present at the vast majority of trial hearings? 
One technique utilized by the Chamber was to start with a reading 
of the Rome Statute “as a whole,” as opposed to first looking at the text 
of Article 63(1).19  In reading the Statute as a whole, the Chamber 
observed that it becomes evident that, besides Articles 63 and 27, the 
other provisions that “will have to be accommodated in the resolution of 
this matter” are Articles 66 (concerning the presumption of innocence) 
and 64 (concerning the powers of the Trial Chamber).20  With respect to 
the latter, the Chamber emphasized that Article 64(6)(f) gives the 
Chamber the powers to “[r]ule on any other relevant matter.”21 
However, if the Chamber’s powers under Article 64(6)(f) can justify a 
clear departure from the text of any provision that pertains to the trial, 
the drafters of the Statute would have needed to write only one single 
provision relating to the trial, namely Article 64(6)(f) with its implied 
all-encompassing powers of the Trial Chamber. 
Furthermore, it is not clear to what extent the Chamber actually 
read the Statute “as a whole.”  Notably, when supposedly reading the 
Statute as a whole, the Chamber did not examine Article 63(1) in light 
of Article 63(2),22 which is the only provision in the Statute that 
explicitly deals with the Trial Chamber’s powers concerning the 
accused’s presence in the court room during trial and makes it clear that 
the circumstances have to be both exceptional and concern the particular 
situation where the accused disrupts the trial: 
 
 18 See Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of the Second Part of Its 
Seventh Session, [1966] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 169, 220, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1966/Add.l. 
 19 Decision on Mr. Ruto’s Request for Excusal from Continuous Presence at Trial, at ¶¶ 31-
33. 
 20 Id. ¶¶ 32-33. 
 21 Id. ¶ 33. 
 22 However, later on its analysis, the Chamber examined the question of whether Article 
63(2) should be understood in accordance with the expressio unius maxim, whereby a combined 
reading of Articles 63(2) and 61(2) would have implied that the Chamber can only exempt the 
accused from presence in instances where the Chamber acts in accordance with Article 63(2).  
The Chamber dismissed the arguments made by Prosecutor and the Legal Representative for 
Victims in this regard as “unpersuasive.”  Id. ¶¶ 54-57. 
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If the accused, being present before the Court, continues to disrupt 
the trial, the Trial Chamber may remove the accused and shall make 
provision for him or her to observe the trial and instruct counsel 
from outside the courtroom, through the use of communications 
technology, if required. Such measures shall be taken only in 
exceptional circumstances after other reasonable alternatives have 
proved inadequate, and only for such duration as is strictly 
required.23 
B. How the Duty to be Present at Trial Became a Right that Can be 
Waived 
The Chamber’s reasoning was further premised on the Statute 
entailing a right of the accused to be present, combined with the 
existence of a rule in customary international law—which the Chamber 
held should inform the reading of Article 63(1)—that the accused has 
the option of waiving this right.24  While the first part of the argument 
concerning the existence of a right to be present at trial follows clearly 
from the text of Article 67(1)(d) of the Statute,25 the second part 
concerning the need to take into account a possible rule of customary 
international law concerning a right to waive the right to be present at a 
trial is certainly not self-evident.  In contrast with several other 
provisions in the Statute that also create rights for the accused,26 Article 
67(1)(d)27 relating to the accused’s right to be present does not stipulate 
that the accused can waive this right.  In other words, as pointed out by 
the Prosecutor in her observations on Ruto’s request, “the drafters of the 
 
 23 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 6, at art. 63(2). 
 24 Decision on Mr. Ruto’s Request for Excusal from Continuous Presence at Trial, ¶¶ 34-37.  
Essentially, the Chamber argued that there is a rule in customary international law that allows the 
accused to waive the right to be present, and that the drafters of the Rome Statute “indicated no 
clear intention to exclude this international legal norm from reasonably influencing the 
interpretation and application of the Statute in the relevant respect.”  Id. ¶ 37. 
 25 Article 67(1)(d), which the Chamber cited in this regard, states that “the accused shall be 
entitled to . . . minimum guarantees . . . ,” including a guarantee 
to be present at the trial, to conduct the defence in person or through legal assistance 
of the accused’s choosing, to be informed, if the accused does not have legal 
assistance, of this right and to have legal assistance assigned by the Court in any case 
where the interests of justice so require, and without payment if the accused lacks 
sufficient means to pay for it . . . . 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 6, at art. 67(1)(d). 
 26 Article 55(2)(d), for example, stipulates that a suspect has the right “[t]o be questioned in 
the presence of counsel unless the person has voluntarily waived his or her right to counsel.”  Id. 
at art. 55(2)(d). 
 27 Id. at art. 67(1)(d). 
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Statute knew how to make the presence of the accused waivable,”28 but 
unlike in the case of the confirmation hearing,29 they chose not to make 
the presence at trial waivable.30  The reason for this is obvious: namely, 
that besides the right to be present spelled out in Article 67(1)(d),31 
Article 63(1) additionally stipulates that the accused shall be present at 
trial.32  Needless to say, whereas some rights can be waived, obligations 
certainly cannot, or in simpler terms: if the presence at trial is both a 
right and a duty of the accused, it is self-evident that it cannot be 
waived. 
Furthermore, the Chamber’s reliance on customary international 
law, as supposedly indicated by the jurisprudence of other international 
tribunals, concerning an entitlement to waive the right to be present33 is 
methodologically dubious.  Regardless of whether customary 
international is actually settled on the accused’s entitlement to waive the 
 
 28 Prosecutor v. Ruto & Sang, Case No. ICC-01/09-01/11-713, Prosecution’s Observations on 
‘Defence Request pursuant to Article 63(1) of the Rome Statute,’ ¶ 8 (May 1, 2013), 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1587847.pdf. 
 29 Article 61(2)(a) stipulates that the accused may waive his or her right to be present at the 
confirmation hearing. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 6, at art. 
61(2).  This difference between the confirmation hearings and the trial hearings was also 
emphasized by dissenting Judge Herrera Carbuccia, who further took note that Rules 123, 124, 
125 and 126 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence include detailed provisions setting out a 
“strict legal framework in which the confirmation of charges can be held in the absence of the 
suspect,” but that no such provisions exist for the trial hearings because this is ruled out by 
Article 63.  See Decision on Mr. Ruto’s Request for Excusal from Continuous Presence at Trial, ¶ 
5 (Carbuccia, H., dissenting). 
 30 An important reason why not all fair trial rights can be waived is that some rights are not 
only intended to protect the accused, but also designed to protect other interests, such as the 
integrity of the justice system itself.  For example, Article 67(c) of the Rome Statute provides the 
accused with the right to be tried “without undue delay” and Article 67(i) provides the accused 
with the right not to have imposed on him or her any reversal of the burden of proof. Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 6, at art. 67.  As noted by the Prosecutor, 
“nobody would argue, however, that the Accused could simply waive these rights and obtain a 
trial with undue delay and a reversal of the burden of proof.”  Prosecutor v. Ruto & Sang, Case 
No. ICC-01/09-01/11-713, Prosecution’s Observations on ‘Defence Request pursuant to Article 
63 (1) of the Rome Statute,’ ¶ 10 (May 1, 2013), http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1587847.pdf. 
 31 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 6, at art. 67(1)(d). 
 32 Id. at art. 63(1). 
 33 Having analyzed the jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
(ICTR) and the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), the Chamber concluded “that the right 
to presence can be voluntarily waived is a settled proposition in international law.”  Decision on 
Mr. Ruto’s Request for Excusal from Continuous Presence at Trial, ¶ 37.  Notably, the Chamber 
observed that according to the ICTR Appeals Chamber, the right to be present “is clearly aimed at 
protecting the accused from any outside interference which would prevent him from effectively 
participating in his own trial; it cannot be violated when the accused has voluntarily chosen to 
waive it.”  Id. 
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right to be present, customary international law has little relevance for 
the interpretation of Article 63(1).  According to Article 21 of the Rome 
Statute, the Statute itself (and the Elements of Crimes and the Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence) are the primary sources of law at the ICC, 
whereas the “principles and rules of international law” are only 
subsidiary sources.34  As Judge van den Wyngaert pointed out in a 
recent opinion,35 the Court’s jurisprudence has made it clear that 
customary international law is a subsidiary source, which may only be 
relied upon by the Chambers when there is a “lacuna in the Statute, 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence or Elements of Crimes,” and “[t]o 
determine whether such a lacuna exists, the Court must first apply the 
applicable rules of interpretation, as provided for by the Statute and the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.”36  However, in this 
instance there is no lacuna in the Statute since—unlike the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) Statute37—it contains a provision 
which clearly establishes that the accused “shall be present during the 
trial.”38 
In other words, if one accepts that besides the provision for the 
accused’s right to be present in Article 67(1)(d), Article 63(1) imposes a 
duty that the accused be present at trial, it certainly takes an innovative 
approach to the interpretation of the Statute to say that a (possible) rule 
of customary international law concerning the accused’s entitlement to 
waive the right to be present should influence “the interpretation and 
application” of Article 63(1)’s duty to be present, as the Trial Chamber 
argues.39 
 
 34 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 6, at art. 21. 
 35 Prosecutor v. Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-02/12-4, Concurring Opinion 
of Judge Christine Van den Wyngaert, (Dec. 18, 2012), http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1529537.pdf. 
 36 Id. ¶ 10.  See similarly Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-
01/09-3, Decision on the Prosecution’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest against Omar Hassan 
Ahmad Al Bashir, ¶ 44 (Mar. 4, 2009), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc639096.pdf; see 
also Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Case  No. 1CC-01/04-168, Judgement 
on the Prosecutor’s Application for Extraordinary Review of Pre-Trial Chamber I’s (March 31, 
2006) Decision Denying Leave to Appeal, (July 13, 2006), http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc183558.pdf. 
 37 Whereas Article 20(4)(d) of the ICTR Statute stipulates that the accused “shall be entitled 
to” be tried in his or her presence (and thus resembles Article 67(1)(d) of the Rome Statute), the 
ICTR Statute does not contain a provision stipulating that the accused “shall” be present at trial.  
See Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, adopted by UN Security Council 
Resolution 955 (1994). 
 38 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 6, at art. 63(1). 
 39 See Decision on Mr. Ruto’s Request for Excusal from Continuous Presence at Trial, ¶ 37. 
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C. A Duty for the Accused to be Present, But No Obligation for the Trial 
Chamber to Enforce the Duty? 
The Trial Chamber further supported its departure from the text of 
Article 63(1) by arguing that while the provision does lay down a 
general obligation for the accused to be present at trial,40 this obligation 
does not extend to the Chamber.41  To support this reading, the Trial 
Chamber noted that in so much as the drafters had wished to create a 
duty for the Chamber, they should explicitly have mentioned that Trial 
Chambers are under a duty to ensure that trials take place only in the 
presence of the accused.42 
With this reading, the Chamber would seem to suggest that when 
the Statute establishes duties, but the Chamber itself is not explicitly 
mentioned as a duty-bearer, it is by no means bound to enforce that 
duty, but may indeed nullify it at its discretion.  Such an interpretation 
of the Statute is far-reaching and stands in contrast to the logic of legal 
drafting.  By way of example, when Article 54(1)(c) stipulates that 
“[t]he Prosecutor shall . . . [f]ully respect the rights of persons arising 
under this Statute,”43 does this then mean that in a given case the 
Chamber may decide that the Prosecutor shall not respect the rights of 
the accused simply because the provision mentions only the Prosecutor, 
not the Chamber, as a duty-bearer?  Or when Article 86 lays down a 
general duty (using the word “shall”) for States Parties to cooperate 
with the Court,44 is the Chamber then authorized to decide that a 
particular State Party shall not cooperate with the Court in so far as the 
text of the provision only indicates that the duty to cooperate falls upon 
State Parties? 
 
 40 Id. ¶ 39. 
 41 Id. ¶¶ 42-43.  The Chamber observed, inter alia, that “the plain wording of Article 63(1) 
and the Statute taken as a whole make the accused the subject of the duty in question,” not the 
Chamber. Id. ¶ 42. 
 42 Id. ¶ 43 (noting that “[h]ad the drafter intended Article 63(1) to impose such a duty on the 
Trial Chamber, it would not have been too difficult for the provision to have been worded in the 
prohibitory model of either rule 60(A) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Special 
Court for Sierra Leone or [sic] 92(1) of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act of 1995 as 
amended, each of which expresses itself in language that so clearly imposes a general restraint on 
the court against proceeding in the absence of the accused; by prohibiting the trial as an action the 
court alone can take, while exceptionally preserving the discretion of the court to proceed in the 
absence of the accused under certain conditions.”). 
 43 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 6, at art. 54(1)(c). 
 44 Id. at art. 86. 
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D. “Overlooking” the Intentions of the Drafters 
The Trial Chamber’s conclusion that in “exceptional 
circumstances” it may exercise its discretion under Article 64(6)(f) of 
the Statute to excuse an accused from continuous presence at trial,45 
also runs contrary to the intentions of the drafters of the Statute, which 
is perhaps why the Chamber’s otherwise rich assessment of sources 
conveniently avoids a discussion of the drafting history of Article 63. 
A brief summary of the drafting history clearly shows that the 
drafters did indeed contemplate various situations where the Trial 
Chamber could commence or continue the trial in the accused’s 
absence—including the possibility that one of parties would request the 
Chamber that the trial take place in the accused’s absence—but in the 
end decided against such forms on trials (other than the particular 
situation mentioned in Article 63(2) where the accused continues to 
disturb the trial and the Chamber removes him or her).  Article 44(1)(h) 
of the 1993 Draft Statute of the International Law Commission required 
the accused “to be present at the trial, unless the Court, having heard 
such submissions and evidence as it deems necessary, concludes that the 
absence of the accused is deliberate.”46  Subsequently, within the 
Working Group on a Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court, 
there had been considerable debate on the question of whether, and if 
so, under what circumstances the Statute should allow for trials in the 
accused’s absence.47  In the Final Report of the Preparatory Committee, 
it was recognized that “three options regarding trials in absentia . . . 
have emerged to date, in addition to the ILC draft,”48 including various 
options whereby the Trial Chamber, in exceptional circumstances, 
would be granted the authority to order that the trial takes place in the 
 
 45 Decision on Mr. Ruto’s Request for Excusal from Continuous Presence at Trial, ¶ 49. 
 46 Report of the Int’l Law Comm’n, 45th Sess., May 3—July 23, 1993, 2 U.N. GAOR Supp. 
No. 10, at 120,  U.N. Doc. No. A/48/10, extract from 48 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n. 
 47 According to some members, any form of trial in the accused’s absence was “completely 
unacceptable from the perspective of a fair trial which respects the fundamental rights of the 
accused.”  Id.  These members also felt “that judgements by the Court without the actual 
possibility of implementing them might lead to a progressive loss of its authority and 
effectiveness in the eyes of the public.”  Id.  Other members, however, “were strongly in favour 
of drawing some distinctions,” whereby trials in absentia should not be allowed where the 
accused “has been indicted but is totally unaware of the proceedings,” but could be allowed 
where the accused “has been duly notified but chooses not to appear before the Court” and where 
the accused “has already been arrested but escapes before the trial is completed.”  Id. 
 48 United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an 
International Criminal Court, 99, U.N. Doc. No. A/CONF.183/2/Add.1, Addendum (Apr. 14, 
1998) (discussing Article 63). 
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absence of the accused.49 
However, as Håkan Friman notes in his detailed account of the 
negotiation process on the topic, in the end “it was obvious that time 
constraints and the persistent lack of common ground would not allow 
the Working Group to find a compromise solution on trial in absentia,” 
and “in order to avoid making this legal-technical question an issue in 
the final negotiations on the Statute, the major stakeholders in the 
debate agreed on confirmation hearings as drafted in the working paper, 
replacing all forms of trial in absentia.”50  Accordingly, “[p]aragraph 3 
of Article 63, dealing with trial in absentia, was dropped altogether and, 
thus, the Statute does not provide for any such trials to take place before 
the Court.”51 
In the situation before Trial Chamber V(a), the preparatory work 
therefore clearly confirms that the text of Article 63 should be 
understood to entail an obligation that the Chamber ensures that the trial 
take place in Ruto’s presence.52 
III. THE CHAMBER’S (MIS)INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE 27 
A. How the Chamber Found that the Requirement of Equal Application 
of the Law Means that the Law Shall Not Necessarily be Applied 
Equally 
Article 27 of the Rome Statute, concerning the irrelevance of 
official capacity, provides that: 
1. This Statute shall apply equally to all persons without any 
distinction based on official capacity. In particular, official capacity 
as a Head of State or Government, a member of a Government or 
parliament, an elected representative or a government official shall 
in no case exempt a person from criminal responsibility under this 
Statute, nor shall it, in and of itself, constitute a ground for reduction 
of sentence. 
2. Immunities or special procedural rules which may attach to the 
official capacity of a person, whether under national or international 
law, shall not bar the Court from exercising its jurisdiction over such 
 
 49 Id. at 100-03 (discussing the various options concerning Article 63). 
 50 Håkan Friman, Rights of Persons Suspected or Accused of a Crime, in THE MAKING OF 
THE ROME STATUTE 247, 261 (Roy S. Lee ed., 1999). 
 51 Id. 
 52 Although the preparatory work is only a supplementary means of interpreting treaties, it 
may be used to “confirm the meaning” resulting from the application of the primary methods of 
treaty interpretation mentioned in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 
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a person.53 
It is difficult to see how the Chamber’s conclusion that “the 
exceptional circumstances” that in its view make an accused’s excusal 
from presence at trial acceptable “include situations in which an accused 
person has important functions of an extraordinary dimension to 
perform”—which in the specific case related to “the functions of the 
Deputy President of Kenya”54—can be compatible with the first 
sentence of Article 27(1).  In fact, the Chamber itself seemed to wonder 
when noting: 
The first sentence of the provision—i.e. that the Statute “shall apply 
equally to all persons without any distinction based on official 
capacity”—necessarily provokes the question whether the accused’s 
request for excusal from the duty to be present during the trial may 
be properly granted to him on the grounds that he requires the 
indulgence in order to permit him to perform the duties of his office 
as Deputy President of Kenya.55 
However, the Trial Chamber also claimed to have an answer to the 
question as it held that the “correct answer to the question will begin 
with an appreciation of the object of the provision, notwithstanding 
isolated words and phrases employed to effectuate it.”56  In this regard, 
the Chamber suggested that the main aim of Article 27(1) is to align the 
ICC Statute with the contemporary norm of international law, according 
to which public officials are no longer entitled to immunity for violation 
of international criminal law.57  
 
 53 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 6, at art. 27. 
 54 Decision on Mr. Ruto’s Request for Excusal from Continuous Presence at Trial, ¶¶ 49-51.  
The Chamber further elaborated that such extraordinary functions that warrant excusal would not 
include “ones that many people are in a position to perform at the same time and in the same 
sphere of operation.”  Id. ¶ 49.  With regard to the conditions of the specific case, the Chamber 
stated its view that “the demands of the office of the executive vice president of a State may meet 
the requirements of the test, depending on what those functions are.”  Id. ¶ 50.  In this regard, the 
Chamber emphasised that “few tasks are more important and extraordinary in their dimension as 
to have a principal role in the management of the affairs and destiny of a State and all its people, 
and their relationship with the world, for any period of time,” and further noted that “how well or 
correctly a particular incumbent performs those functions is a separate question that should not 
encumber the need to permit that incumbent reasonable room in the first place to discharge those 
functions in the right way.”  Id. 
 55 Id. ¶ 65. 
 56 Id. ¶ 66. 
 57 Id.  The Chamber further elaborated: 
Article 27 is mainly intended to accomplish (i) the (now usual) removal of immunity 
from jurisdiction on grounds of official position; and (ii) the removal of any special 
immunity or procedure that impedes effective exercise of jurisdiction of the Court 
over a public office holder in relation to his individual criminal responsibility. 
Id. ¶ 70. 
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Notwithstanding the importance of understanding the object of a 
provision, the rules of treaty interpretation do not permit the Chamber to 
completely circumvent the text of a provision merely because doing so 
may not necessarily run counter to one of the objectives of the 
provision.  Still, this is seemingly what the Chamber admitted to doing 
when stating that it did not “consider that the object of Article 27 is 
offended or wholly defeated merely by allowing Mr. Ruto to be excused 
from continuous presence at his trial in order to permit him to carry out 
the essential functions of the Deputy President of Kenya.”58  Put 
otherwise, the Chamber implies that it is acceptable to rule in a manner 
that contravenes the wording of a provision—in this case, the provision 
of Article 27 that states that the “Statute shall apply equally to all 
persons without any distinction based on official capacity”59—so long 
as the purpose of the provision is not “wholly defeated”.  Again, this is 
certainly a peculiar variant of teleological interpretation, which would 
have far-reaching consequences if applied in other contexts.60  In fact, if 
one follows the Chamber’s reasoning there would have been no reason 
for the drafters to adopt a statutory framework with detailed regulations, 
as they could simply have stated their main intentions and left it to the 
Chambers to develop the law. 
What is more, the Chamber’s reasoning is problematic because 
provisions in the Statute rarely serve one goal only.  While there can be 
little doubt that the Chamber is right in observing that a main goal of 
Article 27 is to ensure that the rules in customary international law 
concerning immunity are not a barrier to criminal prosecutions before 
the ICC, the use of the words “in particular”61 with respect to not 
exempting any person from criminal responsibility regardless of their 
status indicates that this is an important, but not the only, objective of 
 
 58 Id. ¶ 71.  The Chamber further observed that “[t]he object of Article 27 is not to remove 
from the Trial Chamber all discretion to excuse an accused from continuous presence in an 
ongoing trial, when the excusal is recommended by the functions implicit in the office that he or 
she occupies.”  Id.  Using this very specific formulation of what is not the object of Article 27, the 
Chamber appears to confuse the object of the law with the application of the law.  In other words, 
the object of Article 27 is obviously not to prevent that the Chamber allow a prominent official to 
be absent at trial, but as argued in this Comment, one of the objectives of the provision is that all 
suspects are treated equally, an object which is defied by the Chamber’s ruling. 
 59 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 6, at art. 27(1). 
 60 By way of example, a main purpose of Article 15 of the Rome Statute granting the 
Prosecutor the powers to initiate an investigation proprio motu is to create a strong and 
independent Office of the Prosecutor.  This object of the provision would therefore not be 
“wholly defeated” (but quite on the contrary strengthened) if the Court ruled that the text of 
Articles 15(3) and (4), according to which the Prosecutor must obtain an authorization of the Pre-
Trial Chamber to commence such an investigation, simply does not apply. 
 61 Id. 
HANSEN.Updated.to.Editor.1 11/4/2013  8:44 AM 
44 CARDOZO J. OF INT’L & COMP. LAW [Vol. 22:31 
the provision.62  Indeed, the first sentence in Article 27(1) concerning 
equal application of the law appears to align the provision with the 
general prohibition against discrimination and against applying the 
Statute differently on grounds of a person’s status, as stipulated in 
Article 21(3) of the Statute.63 
B. The Search for Support in the Broader Framework of International 
Law 
Perhaps realizing the controversial nature of its conclusion that an 
assessment of the object of Article 27 permits the Chamber to apply the 
Statute differently with respect to persons who perform “important 
functions,” the Chamber also sought to justify its decision to grant 
Ruto’s request with reference to rules in the broader framework of 
international law.64  First, the Trial Chamber found that “international 
law’s recognition of democracy when not held up as a shield against 
inquiries into individual criminal responsibility of elected public 
officers” was of “particular interest” for understanding what it referred 
to as an “unusual situation” before the Chamber, where the prosecution 
of an accused person in his individual capacity was seen to collide with 
 
 62 In other words, if avoiding that state officials be immune from criminal prosecutions was 
the only objective of Article 27, it would have served no purpose whatsoever that the drafters 
included the first sentence of Article 27(1).  Indeed, the observation that there are other objectives 
of Article 27 is supported by the Court’s limited jurisprudence on the provision.  In its decision to 
issue a warrant of arrest for Omar al-Bashir, Pre-Trial Chamber I held that Article 27(1) and (2) 
of the Statute provide for three “core principles”: 
(i) “This Statute shall apply equally to all persons without any distinction based on 
official capacity;” (ii) “[ . . . ] official capacity as a Head of State or Government, a 
member of Government or parliament, an elected representative or a government 
official shall in no case exempt a person from criminal responsibility under this 
Statute, nor shall it, in and of itself, constitute a ground for reduction of sentence”; 
and (iii) “[i]mmunities or special procedural rules which may attach to the official 
capacity of a person, whether under national or international law, shall not bar the 
Court from exercising its jurisdiction over such a person.” 
See Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09-3, Decision on the 
Prosecution’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, ¶ 43 
(Mar. 4, 2009). 
 63 Article 21(3) reads: 
The application and interpretation of law pursuant to this article must be consistent 
with internationally recognized human rights, and be without any adverse distinction 
founded on grounds such as gender as defined in article 7, paragraph 3, age, race, 
colour, language, religion or belief, political or other opinion, national, ethnic or 
social origin, wealth, birth or other status. 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 6, at art. 21(3).  Judge Herrera 
Carbuccia makes a similar point in her dissent.  Decision on Mr. Ruto’s Request for Excusal from 
Continuous Presence at Trial, ¶ 7 (Carbuccia, H., dissenting). 
 64 Decision on Mr. Ruto’s Request for Excusal from Continuous Presence at Trial, ¶ 79. 
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the “reality that the same person has in the meantime become the 
incumbent Deputy President of his country.”65  However, the treatment 
of democracy in international law does not articulate that elected 
officials should be given special treatment in courts of law, nor do these 
rules, as the Chamber claims, make up a strand which is “self-contained 
and independent in its ability to resolve the litigation.”66  Quite on the 
contrary, as noted above, the principles and rules of international law 
are to be applied only when the Statute and the other primary sources of 
law do not provide an answer.67 
Second, the Chamber found that Ruto’s application provoked 
questions “concerning the accommodation that international law permits 
Heads of State and Governments and senior state officials.”68  The 
Chamber held that the chief object of such accommodation is to protect 
the individual concerned against any act which would unduly hinder 
him or her in the performance of his or her duties on behalf of his or her 
state, and that “it is for that reason that such officials are granted 
immunity from the criminal or civil processes of other States.”69  
Although the Chamber took note that “it is now firmly settled that 
accommodations to office holders no longer may go so far as to permit 
such officials immunity from the jurisdictions of international criminal 
courts,”70 it also held that “there is no reason to over-task the principle 
captured in Article 27, especially in a manner that places it on a 
needless collision course with other valid norms of international law.”71  
 
 65 Id. ¶¶ 79-80. 
 66 Id. ¶ 26.  At the outset of its analysis, the Chamber had observed that there are “two distinct 
strands of reasoning that recommend themselves for the present decision,” with each of them 
being “self-contained and independent in its ability to resolve the litigation.”  Id.  Whereas the 
first strand of reasoning related to the Statute itself, the Chamber observed that “the second strand 
of reasoning engages considerations of international law beyond the obvious provisions of the 
ICC Statute.”  Id.  In the end, however, the Chamber observed that when there is a “perceived 
conflict between the two norms, considerations of democracy must yield to the need to conduct 
proper inquiry into criminal responsibility of an elected official for crimes against humanity.”  Id. 
¶ 90. 
 67 Assessing the “democracy argument,” the Chamber also found it necessary to examine how 
Kenya’s Constitution treats the issue of immunity.  Id. ¶ 82.  Whereas this assessment led the 
Chamber to conclude that “it is eminently clear that the Constitution of Kenya and the ICC 
Statute are perfectly in harmony in their agreement that Mr Ruto must stand trial, as charged, 
even though he is the Deputy President of Kenya,” one is of course left wondering why the 
Chamber deems it necessary to undertake an examination of Kenya’s constitutional order, and 
what might have been the implications had Kenya’s Constitution not accepted that the Vice 
President can be prosecuted before the ICC.  Id. 
 68 Id. ¶ 91. 
 69 Id. 
 70 Id. ¶ 92. 
 71 Id. ¶ 95. 
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Such collusion would occur, the Chamber held, “if Article 27 is applied 
in a manner that denies the citizens of a State the dividends of their 
democratic entitlement to elect whom they want into the executive 
presidency of their country, when such an entitlement was not corrupted 
by proof of guilt of the candidate, as such.”72  However, it is not clear 
why requiring Ruto to be present at trial, as stipulated in Article 63(1), 
would have meant that Kenyans were denied the “dividends of their 
democratic entitlement,” especially, one might add, given that Ruto was 
already indicted at the point of the election and had stated his intent to 
stand trial in The Hague.73  It is no less difficult to understand why the 
Chamber believes that Article 27 would have been “over-tasked” by 
simply applying the principle of equality before the law, as follows 
from the first sentence of the provision.74 
Finally, one aspect of international law is curiously missing from 
the Chamber’s otherwise comprehensive analysis of international law 
instruments.  Although Article 21(3) entails a specific prohibition 
against discrimination and explicitly requires the Court to apply and 
interpret the Statute in a manner “consistent with internationally 
recognized human rights,” the Chamber did not take into account that 
virtually every single international human rights treaty contains a clause 
prohibiting discrimination and that equality before the law is a well-
settled principle in international human rights law.75 
 
 72 Id.  Accordingly, the Chamber concluded that 
to apply Article 27 in a manner that eliminates all the legitimate interests outlined 
above, notwithstanding that they do not truly threaten the undisputed jurisdiction of 
the Court to continue with the inquiry into the individual criminal responsibility of 
the accused, becomes inconsistent with the traditional views of justice correctly 
observed “as maintaining or restoring a balance or proportion.” 
Id. ¶ 97.  The Chamber additionally observed that “perhaps, the clearest indication that Article 27 
may not have been aimed at nullifying the traditional rules of international law” with respect to 
immunity of state officials is that Article 27(2) does not proclaim the abolishment of “all 
immunities and special procedures” that attaches to official capacity under national or 
international law.  Id. ¶ 98. 
 73 The charges against Ruto were confirmed on January 23, 2013.  See Prosecutor v. Ruto, 
Kosgey & Sang, Case No. ICC-01/09-01/11-373, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges 
Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the 
Rome Statute (Jan. 23, 2012), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1314535.pdf.  On various 
occasions during the campaigning period, Ruto and Kenyatta stated that they would continue to 
cooperate with the ICC, but following their election the signals have been mixed.  See further 
Thomas Obel Hansen, Kenyatta in State House: What’s Next for Kenya and the ICC?, OPEN 
DEMOCRACY (Apr. 2013), http://www.opendemocracy.net/opensecurity/thomas-obel-
hansen/kenyatta-in-state-house-whats-next-for-kenya-and-icc. 
 74 Decision on Mr. Ruto’s Request for Excusal from Continuous Presence at Trial, ¶ 95. 
 75 By way of example, Article 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides that 
“[a]ll human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.”  Universal Declaration of 
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It is, to put it mildly, difficult to see how the Chamber’s 
interpretation whereby a person who “has important functions of an 
extraordinary dimension to perform” can be excused from trial but a 
person who has less important functions is bound to be present at trial 
could possibly be said to comply with the standards of equality before 
the law.76  By way of example, should Ruto’s co-accused, Joshua Sang, 
dare to make a similar application, it is bound to fail under the 
Chamber’s test as he is a radio broadcaster and thus, unlike Ruto, 
performs functions which in the Chamber’s words “many people are in 
a position to perform at the same time and in the same sphere of 
operation.”77 
IV. REFLECTIONS 
Unless Trial Chamber V(a)’s decision is overturned by the Appeals 
Chamber, the decision to grant Ruto’s request for excusal from 
continuous presence at trial could create a precedent for treating the 
Court’s suspects differently based on their official status.78  While the 
Chamber suggested that the present decision would not necessarily set 
precedent due to its “peculiar” nature arising from Ruto’s “duties of 
state,”79 it seems more likely that given the types of cases addressed by 
 
Human Rights art. 1, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948).  Article 7 
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights holds that “[a]ll are equal before the law and are 
entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of the law.”  Id. at art. 7.  Article 14(1) of 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights stipulates that “[a]ll persons shall be 
equal before the courts and tribunals.”  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 
14(1), Dec. 16 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.  Article 26 of the same covenant stipulates that “[a]ll 
persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal 
protection of the law.”  Id. at art. 26.  As Rhona Smith notes, equality before the law requires that 
all individuals are to be “viewed in law in a non-discriminatory manner, especially with respect to 
the judicial determination of their rights and freedoms . . . .”  RHONA K. SMITH, TEXTBOOK ON 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 235 (3d ed. 2007).  On the importance of the principles of non-
discrimination and equality before the law in international human rights law, see further id. 175-
93, 235-53. 
 76 See similarly Prosecutor v. Ruto & Sang, Case No. ICC-01/09-01/11-777-Anx2, Decision 
on Mr. Ruto’s Request for Excusal from Continuous Presence at Trial, ¶ 7 (Carbuccia, H., 
dissenting) (noting that pursuant to internationally recognized human rights, “all persons shall be 
equal before courts and tribunals and no accused should be accorded privileged treatment, as 
equality under the law is a fundamental value of the administration of justice”). 
 77 These were the standards established by the Trial Chamber.  Decision on Mr. Ruto’s 
Request for Excusal from Continuous Presence at Trial, ¶ 49. 
 78 As the Trial Chamber itself acknowledged, “decisions establish the framework of judicial 
precedents for subsequent cases that identify with the facts and circumstances of earlier cases.”  
Id. ¶ 27. 
 79 Id. 
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the Court, there will be no end to this type of request.80  The Trial 
Chamber has opened the door to treating prominent officials in a 
privileged manner, and future defendants who are involved in the 
business of government are likely to make applications to obtain special 
treatment, citing Trial Chamber V(a)’s decision. 
This is likely to have a negative effect on how the public—and in 
particular the victims—perceive the Court.81  While the Trial Chamber 
remarked that the argument made by the Prosecutor and the Legal 
Representative for Victims that the accused’s absence at trial would 
have a negative impact on how the Court is perceived was an 
“unpersuasive hyperbole with no hint of empirical support,”82 it takes 
little fantasy to imagine that the victims and witnesses in the specific 
case—many of whom have already been intimidated and have yet to see 
any political leader brought to account more than five years after the 
post-election violence took place83—will lose confidence in the process.  
The decision may also more broadly jeopardize the public’s trust in the 
ICC as an institution capable of delivering fair and impartial justice. 
Perhaps in an effort to overcome the perception that the ICC 
endorses “phantom” trials with “no physical reality” for political 
leaders,84 ICC Spokesman Fadi El-Abdallah appeared in Nairobi to 
respond to Kenyan media’s questions relating to the decision as well as 
other concerns relating to the trial soon after the Trial Chamber’s ruling.  
However, El-Abdallah’s assurance to Kenyans that ICC Judges “only 
consider the merits of an application and cannot be swayed by political 
 
 80 See similarly Prosecutor v. Ruto & Sang, Case No. ICC-01/09-01/11-713, Prosecution’s 
Observations on “Defence Request pursuant to Article 63 (1) of the Rome Statute”, ¶ 12 (May 1, 
2013), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1587847.pdf. 
 81 As the Prosecutor noted with respect to the specific case, simply allowing Ruto “to drop in 
and attend any session that he might choose to attend, whenever it would please him . . . would 
undoubtedly have an extremely negative impact on how the Court is perceived by the public and 
more importantly the victims and witnesses.”  Id. ¶ 11. 
 82 Decision on Mr. Ruto’s Request for Excusal from Continuous Presence at Trial, ¶ 73. 
 83 On the intimidation of victims and witnesses, see, e.g., Bernard Momanyi & Simon 
Jennings, Kenya Witnesses Face Harassment, INSTITUTE FOR WAR AND PEACE REPORTING (June 
5, 2013), http://iwpr.net/report-news/kenya-witnesses-face-harassment.  Curiously, the Trial 
Chamber appeared to largely ignore the question of victims and witnesses’ interest in the 
proceedings, though the Chamber did note that the Prosecutor has repeatedly made allegations of 
witness and victim intimidation and interference and that these allegations are currently under 
investigation by the Prosecution in order to ascertain the culprits.  Decision on Mr. Ruto’s 
Request for Excusal from Continuous Presence at Trial, ¶¶ 107-08. 
 84 These were the terms used by the Legal Representative for Victims.  Prosecutor v. Ruto & 
Sang, Case No. ICC-01/09-01/11-749, Submissions of the Common Legal Representative for 
Victims on Partial Absence of the Accused During Trial in Relation to Article 63(1) of the Rome 
Statute,  ¶ 8 (May 22, 2013), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1595232.pdf. 
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declarations [as] ICC proceedings are purely a judicial process”85 likely 
rang hollow to some. 
Discussing the likelihood of national trials for those responsible for 
organizing Kenya’s post-election violence, Stephen Brown and Chandra 
Sriram have noted that it is an unrealistic expectation that “the big fish 
will fry themselves.”86  While Trial Chamber V(a)’s ruling could 
possibly be motivated by promoting the suspects’ cooperation with the 
Court,87 it is starting to look as if the ICC might also be more interested 
in caressing the big fish than frying them. 
 
 
 85 Felix Olick, ICC Defends Ruto’s Granted Request, STANDARD MEDIA (June 28, 2013 5:49 
PM), http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/m/story.php?articleID=2000086986&story_title=ICC-
defends-Rutos-granted-request. 
 86 Stephen Brown with Chandra Sriram, The Big Fish Won’t Fry Themselves: Criminal 
Accountability for Post-Election Violence in Kenya, 111 AFR. AFF. 244, 258 (2012) (U.K.). 
 87 So far, the suspects as well as the government of Kenya have, formally speaking, 
cooperated with the ICC.  However, the government has taken various steps aimed at ending the 
cases, including an admissibility challenge and lobbying for the UN Security Council to defer 
(and more recently terminate) the Kenya ICC cases.  See further Thomas Obel Hansen, Masters 
of Manipulation: How the Kenyan Government is paving the Way for Non-Cooperation with the 
ICC, OPEN DEMOCRACY (May 2012), http://www.opendemocracy.net/opensecurity/thomas-obel-
hansen/masters-of-manipulation-how-kenyan-government-is-paving-way-for-non-.  The 
Prosecutor has on many occasions stated her dissatisfaction with the level of cooperation, and has 
further indicated that her office is extremely concerned with the level of witness intimidation in 
the Kenya situation.  See, e.g., Kenya CitizenTV, supra note 13. 
